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DYSFUNCTIONAL DEFERENCE AND BOARD
COMPOSITION: LESSONS FROM ENRON
Bernard S. Sharfman & Steven J. Toll*

INTRODUCTION
It has been over seven years since the public was first made aware that
Enron (or the ―Company‖) was a troubled firm,1 ultimately doomed to
bankruptcy and much litigation, both civil and criminal. Yet, the Enron debacle continues to fascinate researchers and the general population alike.
Over the one-year period from September 3, 2007 to September 3, 2008, the
Social Science Research Network has posted seventy-one papers that referenced Enron in their abstracts.2 What appears most baffling to many observers, especially those interested in corporate governance, is the inability
of Enron’s board of directors to get a handle on the massive fraud that occurred under its watch. For example, Charles M. Elson, director of the Center for Corporate Governance at the University of Delaware, stated in regard
to the repeated warning signs that the Enron board received during this
time, ―[t]hey should have inquired further,‖ and ―[t]hey were unwilling to
ask and pursue tough questions.‖3 However, for all the research done, a satisfactory explanation has yet to be provided for why the Enron board—
once considered one of the best boards of a large publicly held firm4 in the
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1
In March 2001 the wheels started to come off Enron’s wagon when an article in Fortune magazine
raised questions about Enron’s financial statements. See Bethany McLean, Is Enron Overpriced?,
FORTUNE, March 5, 2001, at 122; see also S. REP. NO. 107-70, at 12–13 (2002) (discussing the Fortune
article and subsequent events in 2001 that began to evidence that ―not all was well at Enron‖).
2
See SSRN eLibrary Database Search, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/DisplayAbstractSearch.cfm (enter ―Enron‖ in the ―Search Term(s)‖ section, then select ―Last Year‖ in the drop menu in the ―Options‖
row) (last visited Sept. 3, 2008) (link). SSRN does not allow searches for exact dates, but does permit
searches for abstracts posted within a specified period before the date of the search. See id.
3
John A. Byrne, Commentary: No Excuses for Enron’s Board, BUS. WK., July 29, 2002, at 50.
4
A publicly held firm is an ―economic organization in which (i) management and residual claimant
status (shareholding) are separable and separated functions; (ii) the residual claims (shares) are held by a
number of persons; and (iii) the residual claims are freely transferable and neither entry to nor exit from
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United States5—failed to detect the fraud that ultimately destroyed the company.
Something was obviously amiss at the top of the Enron pyramid. We
assert that it had something very much to do with the composition of the
Enron board, despite the largely impressive backgrounds of its individual
members. We, of course, are not alone in this opinion, as the fall of Enron
has led to enhanced independence requirements for board members.6
We certainly endorse the board member independence requirements of
the stock exchanges and the enhanced independence guidelines as recommended by proxy advisory companies that have developed as a response to
the Enron scandal.7 Nevertheless, it is our position that corporate boards of
publicly held firms would be better off and less prone to error if other rules
or guidance were in place that required or strongly encouraged corporate
board nominating committees to select members who were less prone to
what we refer to below as ―dysfunctional deference.‖ To implement this
critical change, we recommend: (i) limiting the number of former or current
executive officers allowed to serve as outside directors; (ii) setting term
limits for outside directors; (iii) diversifying the background of outside directors; and (iv) requiring outside directors to spend a minimum amount of
time on board business.
I. DYSFUNCTIONAL DEFERENCE
It is easy to assume that two heads are better than one and that small
groups will make better decisions than individual decisionmakers. And
perhaps, overall, that is correct.8 Even so, behavioral scientists have been
the firm is restricted.‖ Michael P. Dooley, Two Models of Corporate Governance, 47 BUS. LAW. 461,
463 n.9 (1992).
5
See Reed Abelson, ENRON’S COLLAPSE: THE DIRECTORS; Eyebrows Raised in Hindsight
About Outside Ties of Some on the Board, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2001, at C6, available at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E0CE4DA153DF933A05752C1A9679C8B63, (noting
that Chief Executive Magazine named Enron as one of the top five corporate boards in 2000) (link).
6
As so well put by Professors Blair and Stout, ―The notion that responsibility for governing a publicly held corporation ultimately rests in the hands of its directors is a defining feature of American corporate law; indeed, in a sense, an independent board is what makes a public corporation a public
corporation.‖ Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85
VA. L. REV. 247, 251 (1999). However, having a majority of independent directors that meet objective
criteria of independence achieves nothing unless these independent directors also exercise ―independence of mind.‖ See John Roberts, Terry McNulty & Philip Stiles, Beyond Agency Conceptions of the
Work of the Non-Executive Director: Creating Accountability in the Boardroom, 16 BRITISH J. MGT. S5,
S19 (2005). This, of course, is easier said than done.
7
At least ten of the so called ―independent‖ directors at Enron had conflicts involving consulting or
legal work with the Company, or were associated with charitable organizations to which the Company
had made significant charitable donations. See Marleen A. O’Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of
Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1233, 1264 (2003).
8
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance, 55
VAND. L. REV. 1, 3 (2002) (―A wealth of experimental data suggests that groups often make better decisions than individuals.‖).
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saying for years that small deliberative groups are prone to error in their decisionmaking if these groups are made up of a majority of members who are
similar in position prior to deliberations. Such groups can fall victim to
what is referred to as ―group polarization‖—the tendency of a small deliberative group with an initial tendency to move in a given direction to move
to even more extreme positions in that direction following group deliberations.9 The corporate board is no exception to this problem.10
However, the focus here is not group polarization, but something
which we consider to be even more pernicious and error inducing for a corporate board. In regard to several important decisions, the board of Enron
exhibited such extreme deference to Company management that there was
little or no deliberation preceding some of the board’s most important decisions. We refer to this extreme deference to management that leads to little
or no board deliberation prior to a board decision as ―dysfunctional deference.‖
A. Enron Revisited
Even though the vast majority of a corporation’s decisions are made by
corporate officers and their subordinates, the ultimate decisionmaking authority rests with the board of directors.11 When a corporate decision has
the appearance of impropriety or the potential for personal liability, corporate officers may sometimes choose to return the decision back to the board
for approval or ratification. Enron provided us with an excellent example
of how a board should not handle such a situation.
In 1999 and 2000, the Enron board approved waivers to the Company’s code of conduct three times. These waivers allowed Enron’s Chief Financial Officer (CFO), Andrew Fastow, to establish and operate the now
infamous LJM private equity funds. These funds were set up to acquire
Enron assets with the purpose of reducing the size of the Company’s bal9

Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 74
(2000). Professor Sunstein notes that the term ―group polarization‖ is misleading as it can be mistakenly
interpreted to mean that group members move toward opposite positions. Id. at 85.
10
See Cass R. Sunstein, Group Judgments: Statistical Means, Deliberation, and Information Markets,
80
N.Y.U.
L.
REV.
962,
1020
(2005),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=604641 (link).
11
The ―heart‖ of corporate authority lies with the board of directors who have statutory authority to
manage the corporation. Delaware corporate law provides that: ―The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors,
except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation.‖ DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001). In reality, however, the vast majority of significant corporate decisions
made in publicly held firms are shifted downward to senior officers. The law provides for this by allowing the board to relinquish its managerial responsibility and take on more of an oversight function by
allowing the corporate board to provide ―direction‖ and not necessarily management and by allowing for
the appointment of senior officers: ―Every corporation organized under this chapter shall have such officers with such titles and duties as shall be stated in the bylaws or in a resolution of the board of directors which is not inconsistent with the bylaws . . . .‖ DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142(a) (2001).
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ance sheet.12 Such an arrangement clearly provided Fastow with immense
opportunities to engage in self-dealing transactions at the expense of Enron
and its shareholders.13 Unfortunately, that is exactly what happened.14 Ken
Lay, Enron’s Chief Executive Officer (CEO) at the time the funds were
created, was cognizant of the controversial nature of this arrangement, and
therefore sought board ratification despite the fact that he had full authority
to approve the waiver on his own.15 That in itself should have led to long
and intense board deliberations, yet very little in the way of deliberations
were reported prior to board approval, evidencing an incredible and surprising deference to the recommendations of management.16
B. The Pathology of Dysfunctional Deference
Normally, deference by independent board members to the opinion of
insiders and executive management is understandable and most likely beneficial to corporate board decisionmaking. Insider board members, such as
the CEO, will enter board deliberations with a greater degree of knowledge
and understanding regarding the true state of the company than the independent directors. This asymmetric distribution of information should be
beneficial to board decisionmaking, assuming board insiders are honest
about the pros and cons of a prospective decision with the other board
members during deliberations.
However, this deference to board insiders and executive management
can also lead to serious errors in decisionmaking if the deference is so pronounced that it stifles deliberation of a corporate board’s most controversial
decisions. In ratifying the waiver of the Company’s code of conduct for
Fastow with little discussion, the Enron board members demonstrated deference to the recommendations of management, which should be viewed as
dysfunctional and as an act of a board that had been captured by management.
1. Informational Signals and Social Pressures—Dysfunctional deference to executive management and their representatives on the board appears to develop in two ways: through informational signals, which lead
12

See S. REP., supra note 1, at 7–8. The purpose of establishing these entities was to help maintain
the Company’s investment grade credit rating based on the criteria established by rating agencies such
as Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s. Id. at 7. Interestingly, only two of the funds ever became active,
LJM1 and LJM2. Id. at 24 n.56.
13
See id. at 24.
14
See Exhibit A to Plea Agreement, United States v. Fastow, Cr. No. H-02-0665, (S.D.Tex. Jan. 14,
2004) (statement of Andrew Fastow to ―provid[e] a factual background for [his] plea of guilty‖ to
charges of manipulating financial statements and engaging in self-dealing transactions).
15
S. REP., supra note 1, at 25.
16
While there was no evidence of significant deliberations on the topic of the LJM private equity
funds at the three board meetings where they were approved, supposedly there was a vigorous discussion of LJM2 at a board finance committee meeting prior to the approval of LJM2. However, it is not
known whether Fastow’s conflict of interest, the economics of the transaction itself, or both, was the
subject of discussion. See id. at 28.
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board members ―to fail to disclose what they know out of respect for the information publicly announced by others‖ or through social pressures,
―which lead people to silence themselves in order to avoid reputational
sanctions, such as the disapproval of relevant others.‖17
According to Sunstein and Hastie, ―the strength of the informational
signal will depend on the number and nature of the people who are giving
it.‖18 Applying this to a corporate board, if a board’s members include one
or more individuals who are acknowledged to be experts on company operations or have an excellent track record of success, such as inside directors,
then the other board members are likely to be very reluctant to challenge
their opinions and recommendations. Moreover, people are very uncomfortable being sole dissenters.19 In this situation, ―if all but one person in a
deliberating group has said that X is true, then the remaining member is
likely to agree X is true, even to the point of ignoring the evidence of his
own senses.‖20 This phenomenon is somewhat mind-boggling, but the result is that the board may be deprived of key information that potentially
could prevent it from making a bad decision.
The strength of the social pressure will depend on the ―number and nature of those with the majority position.‖21 The greater the majority, the
greater the social pressure on individual members. Moreover, ―if certain
group members are leaders or authorities willing and able to impose social
sanctions of various sorts, others will be unlikely to defy them publicly.‖22
Given the minimal amount of personal contact between Enron board
members it does not appear that significant social pressures were at work.
The contact of non-insider board members with Enron and its management
was quite limited: the Enron board normally held only five regular meetings
per year,23 and outside of formal board meetings, board members did not
have much interaction with each other or with Enron management.24
However, a look into Enron’s history reveals how the board could have
been captured by insiders and executive management on the basis of informational signals. By August 2000, Enron was the seventh largest U.S. firm
by capitalization. Enron had also been named the most innovative firm in
the United States for five years in row by Fortune Magazine.25 Obviously,
17

Cass R. Sunstein & Reid Hastie, Four Failures of Deliberating Groups 2 (John M. Olin Law &
Economics Working Paper No. 401 (2d Series) and Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No.
215, Apr. 2008), available at https://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/401.pdf (link).
18
Id. at 5.
19
See id.
20
Id.
21
Id. at 6.
22
Id.
23
S. REP., supra note 1, at 9.
24
See id. at 10.
25
William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. R. 1275, 1276
(2002).
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the perception in the minds of board members and the general public alike
was that somebody was doing something right at Enron. Moreover, given
the limited interaction between board members and management, and with
so little expected of board members,26 it was reasonable for outside board
members to rely heavily on the opinions of inside board members and executive management.
In addition, the profile of the average Enron independent board member included a stint as a chief executive officer.27 Such a background is
conducive to identifying with executive management and perhaps viewing
his or her role at Enron as making sure not to get in the way of what executive management wanted to do. In the context of executive remuneration,
Professors Jensen, Murphy, and Wruck have already utilized this rationale
in recommending that the number of active CEOs on a public company’s
board be limited.28 Indeed, initial statistical evidence has borne this out.
While Kaufman, Englander, and Tucci have only found weak statistical
evidence that the more CEOs on the board of directors the higher the CEO
compensation, they did find a strong statistical association between the
number of CEOs on a public company’s board compensation committee
and the level of CEO pay.29
Finally, the profile of the average board member included many years
of service on the Enron board, which—particularly during a long period of
time when things are going right at the Company—may induce an outside
director to believe that executive management can do no wrong, leading her
to become highly deferential to executive management recommendations.
For example, if the Enron board had developed over time the perception
that Lay, Jeffrey Skilling (former President and Chief Operating Officer),
and Fastow were geniuses—or close to it—because they had up to that
point an unblemished string of successes, a board just might go along with
the controversial idea of allowing the Company’s CFO to enter into such a
risky conflict of interest transactions.
2. Informational Cascades—As in chess, the advantage in small
group decisionmaking goes to the player who has the benefit of making the
first move. The lack of deliberation regarding the LJM transactions did not
26
Board responsibilities were limited to, basically, five two-day meetings per year plus prep time.
S. REP. supra note 1, at 9–10.
27
See Enron, Proxy Statement Pursuant to Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(Schedule
14A),
at
3–9
(Mar.
21,
2000),
available
at
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1024401/0000950129-00-001279.txt (listing the eighteen nominees
to be elected by shareholders to the eighteen positions on the board of directors) (link).
28
See Michael C. Jensen, Kevin J. Murphy & Eric G. Wruck, Remuneration: Where We’ve Been,
How We Got to Here, What are the Problems, and How to Fix Them 55 (Harvard NOM Working Paper
No. 04-28; ECGI-Finance Working Paper No. 44/2004, July 12, 2004), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=561305 (link).
29
Allen Kaufman, Ernie Englander & Christopher L. Tucci, The Managerial Thesis Revised: Independent Directors and the CEO ―Directorate‖ 34 (July 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Northwestern University Law Review), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1030845 (link).
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mean that board insiders and executive management whom they represented
did not get to have their say. Board members were provided managementgenerated briefing papers prior to the board meeting,30 no doubt recommending or at least leaning in the direction of approving Fastow’s participation in the private equity funds. In an assumed state of strong deference to
insider and executive management recommendations, this may have caused
an informational cascade, which was very hard for the outside board members to overcome.31 According to Sunstein and Hastie, ―a cascade is a
process by which people influence one another, so much so that participants
ignore their private knowledge and rely instead on the publicly stated judgment of others.‖32 Interestingly, people are not considered to be acting irrationally when they come under the influence of an informational cascade;
they are simply succumbing to the pressure of the signals provided by others in the group.33 This may have been the effect of the management generated briefing papers. Alternatively, a domino effect may have been created
where the acceptance of the management position by some board members
(Ken Lay for one) provided a signal to other board members to also accept
the position—right or wrong—without receiving any new information, or to
ignore or fail to disclose any private information or reservations that may
have helped the board move in the direction of disallowing the waivers. In
either case, the insiders on the board got to be the leaders in a game of follow the leader with minimal verbal communication.
C. Groupthink
Marlene A. O’Connor has argued that these failures of the Enron board
were due to another problem with small group deliberations called ―groupthink,‖ which can be described as ―a mode of thinking that people engage in
when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members’
striving for unanimity overrides their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action.‖34 Thus, too much of a warm and fuzzy feeling
between board members can lead a board to make wrong decisions. Yet,
the Enron board did not give the appearance of being overly cohesive. As
already discussed, the entire Enron board met only five times a year and had
30

S. REP., supra note 1, at 27 (written materials on LJM1 were faxed to board members three days
prior to meeting). It was typical for management to provide extensive background and briefing materials prior to a board meeting. Id. at 9.
31
Sunstein & Hastie, supra note 17, at 12–13.
32
Id. at 12. O’Connor defines a cascade to be ―a process whereby an entire group quickly comes to
share a view, which may be false, because some people in the group appear to accept the belief.‖
O’Connor, supra note 7, at 1240. Or, in the context of game theory, ―an information cascade . . . is a
situation in which every subsequent actor, based on the observations of others, makes the same choice
independent
of
his/her
private
signal.‖
Wikipedia,
Informational
Cascades,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_cascade (last visited Sept. 12, 2008) (link).
33
See Sunstein & Hastie, supra note 17, at 12–14; Wikipedia, supra note 32.
34
O’Connor, supra note 7, at 1238 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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very little interaction at other times.35 Furthermore, groupthink focuses on
small group decisionmaking occurring at times of high stress.36 However,
the key decisions facilitating the fraud at Enron occurred during the time
when Enron was doing extremely well, which no doubt minimized the
stress of board decisionmaking. Counterbalancing this lack of personal interaction outside the board room was the similarity in career backgrounds,
as most of the board members had experience as CEOs of large institutions
and very long average tenures on the board.37 Still, it is hard to imagine that
this was enough to create an environment where groupthink prevailed.
Dysfunctional deference—not groupthink—was the more likely cause of
these serious errors in board decisionmaking.
II. RECOMMENDATIONS
Professor William Bratton expressed a very pessimistic outlook for
corporate governance based on the Enron story: ―Enron, then, reminds us
that the monitoring model assures us of little. It gives only a circumstantial
guarantee of good governance because it only requires evidence of a ―conscientious,‖ well-informed business judgment. The conscientiousness itself
is ill-suited to ex post verification.‖38 If that is so, then up-front improvements in board composition become that much more important in reducing
error in corporate board decisionmaking.
Without requiring all board members to be independent, it is impossible to avoid the informational advantages insiders have in board deliberations and the natural deference to insiders and executive management that
this situation creates. However, an all independent board would then be
without the insights, knowledge and understanding of those who know the
company the best. This would cause more harm than good in board decisionmaking. Alternatively, and ideally, public corporations can work to
minimize the negative aspects of a mixed board by tailoring board composition in a way that minimizes dysfunctional deference to insiders and executive management. To this end, based on the lessons of Enron, we
recommend the following:
1. Limit the Number of Former or Current Executive Officers—Limit
the number of outside directors who have been or are CEOs of large institutions—public or private—to less than a majority of outside directors in order to reduce the potential for over identification with insiders and
executive management.
2. Set Term Limits—Term limits are critical to ensure that outsider
board members do not over-identify with insiders and executive management.
35
36
37
38

See S. REP., supra note 1, at 9.
See O’Connor, supra note 7, at 1267.
See id. at 1263.
See Bratton, supra note 25, at 1337–38.

http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2008/38/

160

103:153 (2008)

Dysfunctional Deference and Board Composition

3. Require Knowledge of the Company—Board nominating committees should select outside directors who have knowledge of the Company’s
business or who could potentially learn quickly and with a sufficient depth
of understanding. As stated by McNulty and Roberts in their study on the
effectiveness of boards, ―the exercise of power and influence that comes
with the position of non-executive is critically conditioned by their knowledge of the company.‖39
4. Establish Modified Diversification—Nominate outside directors
with diverse backgrounds, but not to the extent that there is potential for
prospective board members to become lone dissenters. This would also apply to shareholder nominated directors. Better to have multiple shareholder-nominated directors than just one.
5. Require Minimum Time Commitments—It was striking how little
time board members—as the most important decisionmakers at Enron—
were required to devote to their duties. Although board membership is considered a part-time position, there is a need for a minimum time commitment to ensure that outside board members gain the confidence to deliberate
and vote on an issue without total reliance on management recommendations.
While each recommendation is geared toward minimizing the risk of
dysfunctional deference, these recommendations are purposely general.40
Each publicly held firm is different, requiring a unique, tailored application
of these recommendations to fit the needs of each company. Implementation of these recommendations can come through a number of different mechanisms: securities class action or derivative suit settlements, charter or
by-law amendments, institutional shareholder engagement, new stock exchange rules, or positions taken by proxy advisory companies. Moreover,
empirical analysis has yet to be done that could help to both fine tune these
recommendations and propose new ones. For example, statistical analysis
that looks at board composition as a function of securities fraud, with the
independent variables differentiating between criminal and civil events. All
in all, Enron has shown us that dysfunctional deference is something that
39

Roberts, McNulty & Stiles, supra note 6, at S19. This recommendation also requires that the
company provide a minimum amount of director education in order for the outside director to get up to
speed on the operations of the firm. For example, management led orientation programs focusing on
company operations.
40
Of course, there are many other possible improvements in corporate governance—such as majority voting and annual election of directors—that might reduce the likelihood of a similar debacle in the
future. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Sabramanian, The Trouble with
Staggered Boards: A Reply to Georgeson’s John Wilcox, 11 CORP. GOV. ADV. 17 (2003), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=384980 (link); Stephen Deane, Majority Voting in Director Elections: From the
Symbolic to the Democratic (Institutional Shareholder Services Institute for Corporate Governance,
White Paper, 2005), available at http://www.issproxy.com/pdf/MVwhitepaper.pdf (link). We have limited our recommendations in this Essay to those that we believe would help to minimize dysfunctional
deference.
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corporate boards must defend against, with board composition being a viable tool in its prevention.
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